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The desire for the ineffable: on the myth of music as absolute 
This article proposes to establish and critique connections 
between religious and musico-aesthetic conceptions of in-
effability by exploring the link between neoplatonic thought and 
romantic aesthetics. The central thesis is that recourse to the 
ineffable is often made by resorting to theological tenets and, 
consequently, that romantic aesthetics, although desperately 
trying to disengage itself from theological thinking, can in fact 
be interpreted as being inextricably bound up with it. Taking 
Plotinus’ conception of the relationship between the “One” and 
“Intellect” as model, the romantic conception of the absolute is 
revealed to be a fallacy. It is shown that claims of the ineffability 
of music not only locate music as a false absolute, but also 
confer on music a quasi-religious authority. This results in an 
ungrounded secular faith in the power of music and the mastery 
of its composer-god to lead mankind to the truth. Untangling the 
myths of ineffability leads the way to a detranscendentalised 
conception of music with performance at its centre.  
Opsomming 
Die soeke na die onsegbare: oor die mite van musiek as die 
absolute 
Hierdie artikel poog om konneksies tussen religieuse en 
musiek-estetiese beskouings oor die onsegbare uit te wys en te 
kritiseer, deur die gebruik van die term in onderskeidelik neo-
platoniese en romantiese denke te ondersoek. Die sentrale 
hipotese is dat ’n diskoers rondom die onuitspreeklike dikwels 
op teologiese uitgangspunte moet steun en gevolglik, dat die 
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romantiese estetika geïnterpreteer kan word in ’n nóú verbin-
tenis met teologiese denke, ten spyte van ’n amper desperate 
poging tot die teendeel. Met Plotinus se beskouing oor die 
verhouding tussen die “Een” en die “Intellek” as model, word 
aangetoon dat die romantiese beskouing van die absolute ’n 
mistasting is. Daar word daarop gewys dat bewerings oor die 
onsegbaarheid van musiek nie alleen musiek as die absolute 
daarstel nie, maar dat ’n kwasi-religieuse gesag daardeur aan 
musiek verleen word. Gevolglik het ’n onbegronde sekulêre 
geloof in die krag van musiek ontstaan en in die vermoë van die 
komponis-god om die mensdom na die waarheid te lei. Deur die 
mites rondom die onsegbaarheid van musiek uit te wys, word 
die weg gebaan vir ’n gedetransendentaliseerde beskouing van 
musiek met uitvoering as die primêre fokus.  
1. Religion and ineffability  
The concept of the ineffable was born in ancient Greek philosophy 
of religion and has been closely associated with religious thought 
ever since. This association might be said to rest solely on the fact 
that the ineffable as concept holds a central place in religious dis-
course. It was, after all, in writing about the One, the absolute God, 
that Plotinus developed the first detailed theory of the ineffable. In 
modern times, however, we do not reserve the category of the ineff-
able exclusively for talking about God. We are often lost for words 
when talking about our feelings. We cannot describe situations 
adequately, colours lose their hues in conversation, but above all, 
our experience of music seems for the most part to be beyond 
words.  
Other compelling arguments, however, suggest that the relationship 
between ineffability and religion can be observed in ways apart from 
direct appeals to the ineffability of God. According to one such ar-
gument by Moore (2003), the link between ineffability and religion 
can also be explored by acknowledging that attempts to put states of 
ineffable knowledge into words very often result in a language that 
has significant religious resonances (Moore, 2003:167):  
The temptation to treat ineffable states of knowledge as effable 
is of a piece with the urge which we humans have to transcend 
some of our most basic limitations. For the very fact that we 
have such ineffable knowledge, which enables us to make 
sense of things, is an indication of our radical finitude … 
Eventually it becomes a temptation to talk of God. 
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In other words, even though knowledge of God is not the only ineff-
able state of knowledge, the temptation to translate any ineffable 
state of knowledge into words, like our experience of colour or mu-
sic, often goes along with “images of unlimitedness and infinitude” 
(Moore, 2003:167). In more general terms, the “images of unlimited-
ness and infinitude” that are conjured up by claims of ineffability can 
be described as the longing for an absolute, godlike entity. 
Using the link between ineffability and the absolute in Plotinus’ En-
neads (c. 250-270) as a model for the ideal relationship between the 
sublime and the beautiful, I will show the deficiencies of the romantic 
notions of subjectivity and autonomous art – especially as they re-
late to the ineffable. I am not arguing here that the romantic notion of 
the ineffable has its direct lineage in neoplatonic thought (although 
this is indeed a plausible theory), rather, I am juxtaposing two dis-
tinct moments in the history of the ineffable in order to show how the 
concept has been impoverished by the romantic preference for the 
sublime. In turn, what constitutes musical meaning has been im-
poverished too. In section 5, I discuss the survival of the romantic 
notion of the ineffable in current musicology, and suggest an alter-
native approach to the study of music.  
2. The ineffable and the absolute 
From Plotinus’ Enneads, his meditations on the existence of the One 
or the Absolute, much can be learned about the more general rela-
tionship between claims of the ineffable and the absolute. Instead of 
creation ex nihilo, Plotinus proposes that the world comes into exis-
tence through “emanation” from the One. The One is, however, in no 
way impoverished or diminished in the process. In order to find the 
way back to the One, Plotinus proposes three “primary hypostases”, 
three phases of reality, through which the mind must move before 
finding ultimate rest in God. These hypostases, in ascending order, 
are soul, intellect and the One (Plotinus, 1988:1). For Plotinus the 
One is the ultimate cause of all things and an absolutely simple 
reality. The One therefore lies beyond the realm of knowledge and 
discourse: the One is unknowable and ineffable (O’Meara, 1993:54) 
In the first instance, Plotinus’ methodology makes it clear that cha-
racterising absolutes can only be done negatively. If something is 
truly absolute, it follows logically that it should be beyond charac-
terisation, because if it is like something else it ceases to be abso-
lute. In talking about the One we can only say what it is not. There-
fore, even though the link between the ineffable and the absolute 
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might be construed as essentially arbitrary, the converse is not true. 
An absolute is only truly absolute when it is ineffable. 
Contemplating the ineffable in relation to the absolute also reveals a 
second, more psychological implication. In a sense Plotinus is faced 
with a seemingly irresolvable aporia: if the One is ineffable and can 
only be described negatively, how is it possible to speak about it in 
any meaningful way? In O’Meara’s (1993) view the answer can be 
found in the following passage from the Enneads (O’Meara, 1993: 
56):  
Since to say it [the One] is the cause is to predicate an attribute 
not of it, but of us, in that we have something from it, which 
exists in itself. But he who speaks accurately should not say ‘it’ 
or ‘exists’, but we circle around it on the outside, as it were, 
wishing to communicate our impressions, sometimes coming 
near, sometimes falling back on account of the dilemmas that 
surround it. 
According to O’Meara (2000:247), Plotinus never claims that we ac-
tually think and speak the unthinkable and ineffable  
… rather, when we are thinking and speaking the One, we are 
actually thinking and speaking of ourselves, expressing some-
thing in us which can be thought and said, but which refers 
beyond itself, to the One. 
Speaking about the absolute thus inadvertently sets up the speaking 
subject in relation to that absolute, so that what is said is in fact an 
indication of the subject’s deficiency and need (O’Meara, 2000:247). 
Conversely, the absolute takes on a messianic character as the only 
remedy to this sense of eternal lack. Ineffability refers not only to the 
radical finitude of the subject in the shadow of the absolute, but also 
to the desire for becoming one with the absolute. The category of 
the ineffable, as construed by Plotinus, therefore encompasses both 
the sublime and beautiful.  
Bowie (2003:43) describes the Kantian sublime as having “to do with 
things which are so big that they initially make us feel small”. In 
Kant’s (2008:23) own words:  
[T]he sublime, in the strict sense of the word cannot be 
contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of 
reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is 
possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very 
inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous presentation.  
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Kant’s reasoning here is dialectical: the sublime reminds us of the 
limitations of our sensuous relationship to nature and gives us aes-
thetic pleasure via the initial displeasure at the reminder itself. In 
other words, the realisation of the limitations of sensuousness en-
genders the realisation that we also have access to forms of reason 
beyond sensuousness (Bowie, 2003:44).  
The primary difference between the sublime and the beautiful is, ac-
cording to Kant, to be found in the fact that in the sublime “the idea 
of freedom precludes all positive presentations” (Kant, 2008:29). 
Where the beautiful estimates the object in regard to its form, the 
sublime cannot – the sublime is beyond the sensuous. Judgements 
on the sublime involves the object’s formlessness. Although both the 
beautiful and the sublime pleases “on its own account”, the latter 
does so to a greater extent (Kant, 2008:23). In addition, although 
both the sublime and the beautiful pleases, pleasure in the beautiful 
is “positive” – life-enhancing and joyous, while pleasure from the 
sublime is “negative” – more like respect (Guyer, 1992:382). 
In Plotinus’ conception of the absolute, this distinction between the 
sublime and the beautiful is absent. Meditating on the ineffability of 
the One produces both awe and pleasure, both the experience of 
the transcendent as absolutely unknowable, and a view of the trans-
cendent as a “supra-hierarchical summit that we may gradually hope 
to scale” (Milbank quoted in Lochhead, 2008:70). 
Kant’s philosophical distinction between the sublime and the beau-
tiful not only marks the “subjective turn” in philosophy, but also the 
rise of the second broad area of importance for the ineffable – 
aesthetics.  
3. From religion to aesthetics 
Although Kant himself did not consider music to be the “highest” art, 
his definition of the sublime in terms of unrepresentability provided 
the impetus for the radical reconfiguration of the status of music that 
took place in romanticism. The philosophical importance given to 
music towards the end of the eighteenth century can, according to 
this view, be directly attributed to the fact that music was seen to 
represent the non-representational, in other words, the ineffable. In 
this time music becomes significant, in the words of Bowie (2003:2), 
“as a means of understanding subjectivity”. “Music”, Bowie (2003:2-
3) continues, “makes evident the fact that understanding subjectivity 
can never be fully achieved through theoretical articulation”. The 
world can therefore not be exhausted by theoretical knowledge 
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alone. Beyond the borders of theoretical knowledge Kant (2008:49) 
finds the “aesthetic idea”:  
… that representation of the imagination which induces much 
thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought, i.e. 
concept, being adequate to it and which language con-
sequently, can never quite get on level terms with or render 
completely intelligible. 
The aesthetic idea can be equated with what Kant (2008:8) also 
calls the “universal voice” or the sensus communis, which ensures 
the universality of aesthetic judgments.1 As such, it is the ima-
gination that stands at the root of all knowledge for Kant (Eagleton, 
1990:102). The ineffability of the aesthetic idea therefore points to-
wards a view of the subject as absolute. This idea not only supports 
Kant’s insistence that the rational subject stands at the centre of the 
cognitive and moral worlds, but also pre-empts the importance of 
music for the romantics. Schlegel (quoted in Bowie, 2003:37), build-
ing on Kant’s ideas, situates music at the moment of cognition of the 
subjective: 
[I]f feeling is the root of all consciousness, then the direction of 
language [towards cognition] has the essential deficit that it 
does not grasp and comprehend feeling deeply enough, only 
touches its surface ... However large the riches of language 
offers us for our purpose, however much it can be developed 
and perfected as a means of representation and commu-
nication, this essential imperfection must be overcome in anoth-
er manner, and communication and representation must be 
added to; and this happens through music which is, though, 
here to be regarded less as a representational art than as 
philosophical language, and really lies higher than mere art. 
Schlegel’s view of music as philosophy, situated as it is in the in-
effability of its sonic reality, ironically removes music from the phe-
nomenal world and devalues music as sound. Music, in Schlegel’s 
“philosophical” sense, acts as a model for subjectivity – as a sym-
bolic medium for self-cognition. Therefore, the ineffability of Kant’s 
“aesthetic idea” is as much a move towards absolute subjectivity as 
it is a move to autonomous art.  
                                      
1 When Kant says that the universal voice is only an idea (Kant, 2008:8), the 
“idea” referred to is in fact the “aesthetic idea”, argues Guorova (2008). 
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With the balance shifted to “pure” or “ideal” music, the holy trinity of 
nineteenth-century thought on music is born: autonomous music, in-
effability, subjectivity. Or as Chua (1999:148) puts it:  
The lack of self-presence became the zero-origin of music’s 
autonomous generation; the lack of rational concept became 
the logic of a language beyond language; and its lack of 
visibility became the ineffable representation of the noumenal 
self. 
The importance of the ineffable in romanticist thought on music can 
be drawn along two lines, both tied up with what Lydia Goehr calls 
music’s emancipation from the extramusical. Goehr (1992:152-157) 
identifies two aspects of the romantic aesthetic that played an in-
tegral part in this emancipation – the transcendent move and the 
formalist move. The transcendent move culminated in the realisation 
that the value of art no longer lay in its ability to bring home religious 
or moral values, but that art was a pathway to a secular eternal, to a 
truth that transcends the worldly, to the ineffable. The formalist 
move, on the other hand, tried to bring music’s meaning from the 
outside to the inside. Musical meaning no longer resided in repre-
sentation, but was to be found in the “internal, structural coherence” 
of music.  
For Goehr the transcendent and formalist move were instrumental in 
the construction of what she calls the “work-concept”2 in music. As I 
will show, however, the fact that both these ideas are so closely tied 
up with the ineffable, suggests a deeper layer of significance that 
has mostly been overlooked by narratives on the emergence of the 
musical work. This significance, I believe, is the result of a complex 
process of mythmaking around music: a misconstrued portrayal of 
the absolute in music, which resulted in a quasi-religious authority 
being imposed on the musical work and the composer to the 
detriment of actual musical performance. 
                                      
2 According to Goehr (1989:55) the concept of the musical work came into 
existence towards the end of the eighteenth century. Before this time music was 
understood mainly in terms of its social, religious or scientific function, and not 
as an autonomous art form. Thus a musical work is defined as “a composer’s 
unique, objectified expression” and a “public and permanent artifact made up of 
musical elements”. Furthermore, a musical work is “fixed with respect, at least, 
to the properties indicated in the score and is repeatable in performances”.  
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4. The myth of music as absolute 
Levinson (1995), in a review of Diana Raffman’s book Language, 
music, and mind (1993) comes to some baffling conclusions. Levin-
son finds Raffman’s focus on the ineffable knowledge of, or through 
musical performances, or concrete musical events “surprising”, and 
for philosophers of music, “ultimately unsatisfying”. The reason for 
Levinson’s surprise is that the “traditional notion of musical ineff-
ability ... concerns ineffable knowledge of or through musical works”. 
“The fact”, he continues, “is that it is the ineffability resident in expe-
rience of musical works, not in experiences of their performances as 
such, that has motivated claims in aesthetics about what music 
imparts to us that cannot be verbally expressed, or perhaps ex-
pressed in any medium other than music”:  
That is to say, the ineffability of greatest interest, if it exists, 
resides in notatable, fully effable musical structures, rather than 
individual, maximally nuanced instantiations of those structures. 
The more important kind of ineffability in music, if it exists, 
concerns what music conveys, or at least gives the impression 
of conveying about human life: its pattern and dynamic, its 
attitudes and emotions, its conflicts and significances. The in-
effability of what is grasped in auditing Beethoven’s Piano 
Sonata Op. 90, or Schubert’s ‘Death and the Maiden’ Quartet, 
or Mahler’s Ninth Symphony, or Berg’s Violin Concerto, is not a 
matter of, or in any way dependent on, the ineffability of the 
maximally specific pitches, rhythms, and dynamics by which a 
specific performance of those works acquaints or reacquaints 
us with them. (Levinson, 1995:201.) 
It is clear here that Levinson underscores the superiority of the 
sublime over the beautiful, as proposed by Kant. The distinction Le-
vinson makes between musical works “themselves” and performan-
ces of these works are peculiar, to say the least, and aligns sur-
prisingly closely with Schlegel’s idea of music as “philosophical 
language”. The problem with this is, among others, that real, actual 
and live music is cast aside in favour of either the musical score, or 
even worse, the “idea” of the musical work. Even more disturbing is 
Levinson’s claim that what music conveys about human life is to be 
found not in the actual experience of music, but through a supra-
audible and ahistorical knowledge of “fully effable musical struc-
tures”. Not only is such an argument elitist, it is also guilty of mani-
fold other sins: depreciating the role of the listener in constructing 
musical meaning, encouraging score-based reflection on music, 
while ignoring the power of music in performance, assuming that all 
music is instrumental, and German, for that matter, and overlooking 
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the historical and political real-life “work” that music does. “Music as 
philosophical language” absolutises music: in this sense, music is its 
own first cause, its truth-content is immanent and its significances 
are ineffable. Although Levinson’s views, as a philosopher of music, 
is not paradigmatic of musicological thinking, the naturalness with 
which ideal music takes priority over actual musical sound in his 
argument is endemic to musicological discourse as a whole.  
The myth of music as absolute can be explored by comparing the 
absolute subjectivity of the romantics to Plotinus’ thinking about the 
absolute One. This is made possible by the fact that the romantics, 
for the most part, equated arguments for absolute subjectivity with 
arguments for music as philosophical language.3  
The language of the romantics mirrors that of Plotinus in many 
ways, most significantly so when the matter at hand is the 
correlation between the ineffable and the absolute. In a very 
neoplatonist manner Novalis (quoted in Bowie, 2003:78) describes 
the absolute “I”: 
I means that Absolute which is to be known negatively – what is 
left after all abstraction – what can only be known by action and 
what realises itself by eternal lack. 
With these words Novalis endorses the logical link between 
ineffability and the absolute, which comes to the fore in the 
deficiency of the subject attempting to say the ineffable. There are, 
                                      
3 Hegel is a notable exception here. Although he (Hegel, 1998) states that “the 
chief task of music consists in making resound, not the objective world itself, 
but, on the contrary, the manner in which the inmost self is moved to the depths 
of its personality and conscious soul” (Hegel, 1998:891), Hegel sees music as a 
subordinate manifestation of the truth. In addition, Hegel seems, contrary to the 
Zeitgeist, to prioritise music with words over instrumental music. A higher form 
of truth is possible in music with words, as instrumental music is only an 
expression of “feeling”. On the other hand, music coupled with words “gives us 
distinct ideas and tears our minds away from that more dreamlike element of 
feeling which is without ideas” (Hegel, 1998:937). For Hegel it is not true that 
music can express things words cannot and he sees the unrepresentational 
nature of music as its essential limitation, as is evident from the following 
passage:  
Especially in recent times music has torn itself free from a content already 
clear on its own account and retreated in this way into its own medium; but 
for this reason it has lost its power over the whole inner life, all the more so 
as the pleasure it can give relates to only one side of the art, namely bare 
interest in the purely musical element in the composition and its 
skillfulness, a side of music which is for connoisseurs only and scarcely 
appeals to the general human interest in art. (Hegel, 1998:899.) 
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however, two key difference between the neoplatonic and romantic 
take on the absolute.  
The first difference lies, in my view, in Plotinus’ insistence on 
differentiating between the One and Intellect (Nous), even if the two 
are in many ways similar. For Plotinus the One is the first cause and 
therefore the originating principle of the Intellect. Because the One is 
absolutely singular and self-sufficient, needing nothing for its own 
existence, not even self-consciousness, it cannot be said to have 
consciously created or determined Intellect. Rather, Plotinus wants 
us to understand the relationship between the One and Intellect, and 
indeed the entire universe, as one of emanation. Plotinus explains 
the concept of emanation with the metaphor of a river overflowing 
and of light emanating from a beam. Without any conscious decision 
on the part of the One, it shares characteristics of itself with Intellect. 
In the words of Lekkas (2004:54) “it is not that the One is a higher 
version of Nous, but that Nous is a lesser version – ‘an image’ – of 
the One.” Thus it can be said that Intellect is the One conscious of 
itself. This differentiation holds the belief in the absolute intact, 
without the One being lost in its own autonomy – not needing 
anything, but at the same time being totally superfluous.  
The absolute of the romantics radically differs from this conception. 
The foundation for this difference can be found in the realisation, 
mainly as a result of the legacy of Kant, that there is no compelling 
guarantee that the coherence of the world is the result of divine 
creation (Bowie, 2003:3). With God taken out of the equation, a new 
absolute had to be found – the absolute “I”.  
The turn to absolute subjectivity is nowhere more evident than in the 
work of Fichte. Radicalising Kant’s focus on the subject through his 
belief that the structures of self-consciousness mediate everything 
we can say about reality, Fichte’s total world became the product of 
the I (Bowie, 2003:58). But for Fichte the absolute I is not fact, but 
action – the act of the I thinking itself (Bowie, 2003:63; 
Chua,1999:162). In this way the I becomes at the same time the 
absolute origin and the object of its reflection. At pains to disengage 
themselves from theological thinking, it was of paramount im-
portance for the romantics to prove that subjectivity arose, as it 
were, from itself. Without a truly spontaneous turn to self-con-
sciousness, self-consciousness would have had to be interpreted in 
terms of cause and effect, meaning that the I couldn’t be absolute as 
it wasn’t its own cause.  
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This idea had a profound influence on nineteenth-century musical 
thought. The formalist move, referred to earlier, can be interpreted 
as the musical equivalent of Fichte’s absolute subjectivity. For music 
to become truly absolute, it had to become a sign involved in what 
Chua (1999:171) calls the “double play of self-signification”. Music 
could point towards the realm of the infinite only by referring to itself. 
It could only signify the absolute by being itself absolute. Because 
absolute music indicated infinity from within itself it was seen as 
poiesis ex nihilo – pure productivity. Music could therefore produce 
meaning through its own musical material. It could represent the 
outside without ever leaving the domain of insideness.  
The “double play of self-signification” suggests a paradoxical rela-
tionship between ineffability and immanent meaning in music. Al-
though music could represent the extra-musical by turning back onto 
itself, it was the sheer ineffability of music that gave it its cognitive 
content in the first place. Chua (1999:171) puts it this way: 
Music is not only a sign that refers to the ‘realm of the infinite’, 
but seems to indicate that realm by referring to itself; in its 
semiotic play, music assumes an internal recognition of itself as 
absolute. 
Fichte’s philosophy of absolute subjectivity, on which the ineffability/ 
immanent meaning paradox is based, is, however, deeply flawed, as 
Hölderlin (quoted in Bowie, 2003:68) was first to recognise: 
[Fichte’s] absolute I … contains all reality; it is everything, and 
outside of it there is nothing; there is therefore no object for this 
absolute I, for otherwise the whole of reality would not be in it; 
but a consciousness without an object is unthinkable, and if I 
am this object myself, then as such I am necessarily limited, 
even if it only be in time, thus not absolute; thus there is no 
consciousness thinkable in the absolute I, as absolute I (Ich) I 
(ich) have no consciousness, and to the extent to which I have 
no consciousness I am (for myself) nothing, therefore the 
absolute I is (for me) nothing. 
Hölderlin is arguing here that the idea of a conscious absolute – 
whether it be subjective or musical – is philosophically untenable. In 
the light of Plotinus’ conception of the One, Hölderlin’s criticism 
makes perfect sense. Plotinus’ theory of emanation protects the 
absolute from dividing into itself, becoming conscious of itself, and 
thereby giving up its status as absolute. For, as Hölderlin points out, 
a truly absolute I would not be capable of consciousness as this 
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would indicate some sort of need within itself – a need that would 
then have to be transcended.  
A second point of divergence between the romantic and neoplatonic 
conception, concerns the distinction between the sublime and the 
beautiful. As noted above, Plotinus’ One is both sublime and beau-
tiful, both awe-inspiringly distant and, at least potentially, life-en-
hancingly close. On the contrary, Milbank (1998) argues that mo-
dernity and postmodernity “tend strictly to substitute sublimity for 
transcendence”. Where once God was both sublime and beautiful 
“all that persists of transcendence is sheer unknowability or its qua-
lity of non-representability and non-depictability” (Milbank, 1998: 
259). Ineffability divorced from the beautiful is what fuels the need 
for Fichte’s self-conscious absolute in the first place. Without the 
beautiful, any absolute – whether it be the One, the self or music – 
runs the risk of becoming so closed off to the world that it becomes 
irrelevant. On the other hand, the beautiful is invidious to an “internal 
recognition of itself as absolute”, because the beautiful implies an 
embeddedness in the sensuous – the very thing that both absolute 
subjectivity and absolute music tries to escape.  
Efforts to smooth over these errors in romantic and idealist thought 
have resulted in an elaborate myth being constructed around 
absolute subjectivity, and through the appropriation of poets and 
artists, around music. Through the fallacy of the musical absolute, 
contained in the desire for the ineffable, romantic musical expe-
rience became, according to Schleuning (as paraphrased by Erauw, 
1998:114) an autonomous religious practice that was part of the 
process of secularisation. With subjectivity gaining leeway over 
traditional religion, music has been ascribed many of the categories 
and roles traditionally associated with church worship (Erauw, 
1998:114; Goehr, 1992:157). Willem Erauw (1998:115) contends 
that the “secularized religion of music” has its roots not only in 
secularisation, but also in the Judeo-Christian tradition itself, prima-
rily through a suppression of the sensuous implicit in the Judeo-
Christian worldview. This suppression has resulted in a modern 
concert hall etiquette where a bodily experience of music is actively 
discouraged. In addition, Dahlhaus (1991:80) argues that Herder’s 
view of aesthetic contemplation as “devotion” or “religious awe” is 
intimately tied up with music’s ineffability:  
Only if wordless music ‘elevates’ itself above speech, instead of 
remaining beneath it, can one sensibly allow elevation to 
religious devotion and the contemplation of absolute music to 
merge into one another. 
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Claims of the ineffability of music therefore not only locate music as 
absolute, it confers on music a quasi-religious authority, which 
results in an ungrounded faith in the power of music to be self-
referential and in the mastery of the composer to bring mankind 
closer to experiencing infinity, as Hoffman would have us believe 
(Charlton, 1989:234-251).  
5. Challenges for musicology 
Musicology stands in an uneasy relationship to the myth of music as 
absolute. In the current intellectual climate, with its preoccupation 
with place and particularity, it is becoming increasingly unfashion-
able to read things divorced from their contexts. The concomitant 
trend in musical historiography has been to recognise the impor-
tance of contexts and the difficulties in locating them. On the other 
hand, musicology remains heavily indebted to the myth of music as 
absolute, as Erauw (1998:115) argues: 
If musical experience had not become a sacred autonomous 
world of sounds, which has been praised and sanctified as a 
mirror of heaven since the late 18th century, the intellectual and 
spiritual discourse would probably never have developed in 
which music is perceived as something very serious, and 
thereby as the basis for a more scientific approach. In other 
words, whether they are happy with the notion of a musical 
work or not, scholars in musicology are all still heirs to romantic 
aesthetics. 
The ineffable continues to survive as a heirloom of romantic aesthe-
tics in current musicology – especially in musical hermeneutics and 
some so-called “contextual” approaches to music.  
In her article Abbate (2004) argues that the ineffability of music, 
although generally scorned by hermeneuticians of music, is in fact a 
necessary prerequisite for hermeneutic inquiry. This might seem like 
a paradoxical line to take: how can hermeneutics, which pre-
supposes an immanent content to music, be indebted to views of the 
ineffability of music which seem to deny that such immanence exist? 
The ineffability-immanence paradox, however, is central to the 
romantic conception of the musical work through the double play of 
self-signification.  
The idea behind musical immanence is that sonic traces of history 
are encoded in music and that it is possible to decode these latent 
meanings (Nattiez, 1990:28-30). Fundamental to this line of thought 
is that the composer has no conscious knowledge of encoding the 
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music with these meanings. Rather, it is as if the musical material 
itself creates distinguishable links with the political, social and 
intellectual climates in which it took form. Adorno (2002:391, 393) 
shares a similar view of the nature of the musical work of art: it is 
precisely music’s self-referentiality that allows for connections with 
the outside to be formed. 
No matter where music is heard today, it sketches in the 
clearest possible lines the contradictions and flaws which cut 
through present-day society; at the same time, music is 
separated from this same society by the deepest of all flaws 
produced by this society itself.  
[M]usic fulfils its social function ... when it presents social 
problems through its own material and according to its own 
formal laws – problems which music contains within itself in the 
innermost cells of its technique. 
In recent times, however, it is the very distinction between the music 
itself and the extra-musical that has come under attack. Taruskin 
(1997), for instance, argues that the distinction between the musical 
and the extra-musical is false; that one cannot exist without the 
other. He sees both extremes of the text/context debate as 
delimiting. “On the one hand”, writes Taruskin (1997:480),  
… are those who would prefer to simplify matters by denying 
the very existence (or the ‘reality’) of a latent content and 
claiming for music the status of an inherently or ideally 
nonreferential medium, unattached to the wider world and 
beatifically exempt from its vicissitudes […] On the other hand 
are those who not only acknowledge the immanence of a latent 
musical content but seek, or presume, to define it, to fix it, to 
make it manifest, to have it name names and propound 
propositions.  
Instead he contends that latent musical meaning should neither be 
negated nor “successfully administered”; that the value of music is 
best appreciated when latent meaning is “acknowledged but 
contested” (Taruskin, 1997:481). With these kinds of arguments 
many myths have been displaced. The interpreter is given room to 
play an active role in creating meaning and the idea that musical 
meaning cannot be fixed or owned is developed. 
The central tenet that music has immanent cognitive content has, 
however, miraculously survived this onslaught in the form of 
hermeneutics. Kramer (1990:1; 2003), for example, sees the claim 
that music has discursive meanings as a necessary condition for the 
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hermeneutic project; and it is easy to see why. For any process of 
decoding to take place there must be something to decode in the 
first place.  
Precisely how are musical works supposed to represent the social 
conditions of their production and how do they manage to reveal 
aspects of the composer’s identity or philosophical beliefs? In what 
sense can Stravinsky’s music be seen as the sonic trace of a 
“stripdown” from humanism to biologism in early twentieth-century 
music, and The rite of spring and Svadebka as a reflection of the 
composer’s “lifelong antihumanism” and anti-Semitism, a “cele-
bration of the unquestioned subjection of human personality to an 
implacably demanding … social order”, as Taruskin (1997:382) 
would have us believe? The error that enables Taruskin to persist in 
claiming a cognitive content for music, is the fact that he falls into 
the trap of the double play of self-signification. In the light of the 
ineffability/immanent meaning paradox no real distinction can be 
made between viewing the musical work as an ineffable “non-
referential medium” devoid of latent content and claiming that it has 
a manifest latent content, for both these views spring from the same 
source – a view of music that relies on insideness. Indeed, the 
ineffability of music is the required first step for music to be able to 
represent anything. 
The romantic legacy of the ineffable is also evident in some so-
called “contextual” approaches to music. In his appeal to shift the 
focus from a “dogged concentration on internal relationships within a 
single work” to a more “contextual” approach, Kerman (quoted by 
Christensen, 1993:21) remarks that “by removing the bare score 
from its context in order to examine it as an autonomous organism, 
the analyst removes that organism from the ecology that sustains it”. 
The musical work therefore becomes a product of its surroundings, 
determined by the “environmental factors” that shape its physiology. 
While the contextual move has led to a new understanding of the 
embeddedness of music in society and has, in so doing, ridded 
musicology of some of its grand narratives, the “contexts” of musical 
works have in other cases become the hiding place for many of the 
ideologies that the new musicology has tried so hard to eradicate. A 
poietic definition of context keeps the glass house of the composer 
god intact.  
Kramer’s contextual approach unravels with LaCapra’s recognition 
that the context does not exist, but that it is in itself a kind of text that 
relies on interpretations rather than descriptions. Furthermore, that 
the “problem in understanding context … is a matter of inquiry into 
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the interacting relationships among a set of more or less pertinent 
contexts”. “Context” thus arises from a comparative exercise rather 
than an objective description (LaCapra, 1983:95-96). Along the 
same lines, White (quoted by Zammito, 1993) states that  
… it is misguided to suppose that this context, the ‘historical 
milieu’, has a concreteness and an accessibility that the work 
itself can never have […] The historical documents are not less 
opaque than the texts studied by the literary critic. Nor is the 
world those documents figure more accessible. The one is no 
more ‘given’ than the other. 
Finding the “context” that predetermines and shapes the musical 
work is therefore not only a methodological problem, but an 
epistemological impossibility.  
Trying to locate the “social context” of a work exclusively in the 
moment of production, at the expense of the social contexts that 
make up the afterlife of a work, reveals a series of fundamental 
beliefs about the nature and purpose of musical works, most of 
which can be extrapolated from this highly problematic passage by 
Tomlinson (1988:121): 
We study, or should study works of art as records of human 
aspiration, achievement, and meaning in contexts different from 
our own. We should cherish them for what they tell us about the 
diverse creative acts that gave rise to them. When instead we 
view them ahistorically – as aesthetic objects uprooted from 
some context that we believe engendered them and trans-
planted into our own cultural humus – then we forfeit the 
possibility of conversing meaningfully with their creators. With 
easy but all-too-familiar meanings we talk mainly among our-
selves, reflected in the work, and not with the work’s creators 
shining through it. The work is a mirror rather than a magnifying 
lens, so to speak. And by regarding it as a mirror we give up or 
at least drastically limit our ability to broaden our world of 
discourse. 
The fundamental fallacy of poietic reasoning is the assumption that 
an “ahistorical” approach to musical works equals an “aesthetic” 
one, where works are seen as abstract, contextless objects. In other 
words, that any approach that doesn’t locate the primary meaning of 
a musical work within the context of its origin, necessarily leads to 
aestheticism. Tomlinson’s (1988) view of the historical precludes 
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any presentist4 understanding of music. If it is limiting (read: wrong) 
to “transplant” music into a different “cultural humus”, the entire 
project of reception histories is doomed to fail. The implication of 
Tomlinson’s view is that reception histories are ahistorical or, at 
least, that they tell the wrong histories. This kind of reasoning 
exemplifies musicologists’ obsession with the moment of production, 
the status and authority of the composer and a near denial of the 
fact that Western canonic music has played, and continues to play, 
a significant part in constructing social identities in contexts other 
than that of their own production.  
The way Tomlinson ignores reception history reveals a much more 
“aesthetic” approach to musical works than he would have us 
believe. Focusing on poietic processes freezes the latent content of 
music in a specific time and place and upholds the work of music as 
an almost religious artefact not to be touched or tampered with. It 
implies that musical works have a stable ontology – an abstract 
reality removed from its performance and its “social context”. If 
musical works are “records of human aspiration, achievement, and 
meaning”, they should have an immanent, unchangeable truth-con-
tent. “Social histories” in this sense become add-ons to traditional 
musical historiography. Behind the smokescreen of context, and 
with the use of a new socially informed vocabulary, the double play 
of ineffability and immanence is invoked yet again.  
The only real alternative is to see performance as the primary object 
of study, focusing on the local and once-off meanings that are thus 
created. Such a project would not be without sacrifices, as Derrida 
(1991:221) recognises. In order to answer the question What is 
poetry?, in order to understand it in different social contexts, “you 
will have had to disable memory, disarm culture, know how to forget 
knowledge, set fire to the library of poetics. The unicity of the poem 
depends on this condition. You must celebrate, you have to 
commemorate amnesia …”  
The shift to performance insists on the rejection of a set of beliefs – 
a step, as Abbate (2004:510) points out, that has a wide range of 
implications. 
                                      
4 A presentist or “whiggish” history (often used in derogatory terms) is one where 
history is told from a contemporary perspective, using concepts that might have 
been foreign to people living at the time. In musical discourse a presentist 
approach will be one that focuses on music’s role in contemporary society, 
rather than trying to reconstruct the context in which it was conceived. 
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[F]ixing upon actual live performances would mean embracing 
the drastic, a radical step. There is no a priori theoretical armor. 
In practical terms, it would mean avoiding the tactile monu-
ments in music’s necropolis – recordings and scores and 
graphic musical examples – and in the classroom this is nearly 
impossible. In some larger sense it might even mean falling 
silent, and this is difficult to accept because silence is not our 
business, and loquacity is our professional deformation. 
Forgetting, then, and falling silent. Forgetting, first of all, the “author-
function”, the poietic, the authority of the composer. Secondly, the 
musical work with its double play between ineffability and immanent 
meaning.  
The author-function, writes Foucault (1991:107-108), points not ne-
cessarily to the creator of a text, but serves to characterise “the 
mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses 
within a society”.  
[T]he fact that the discourse has an author’s name … shows 
that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely 
comes and goes … On the contrary, it is a speech that must be 
received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must 
receive a certain status.  
Once the poietic is revealed for what it is – a mechanism for jus-
tifying privileged discourses in society – the ramifications of the 
denouncement of the authority of the composer come to light.  
For Barthes (1977), abandoning the author-function first of all 
changes the temporality of a text. Because the author can no longer 
be seen as antecedent to the text, as its past, the reader becomes 
the ultimate architect of the context in which it is understood – a 
complex network of triggered memories, arbitrary connections and 
past experiences. Just as Cook (2006) sees performance as the 
abolishment of the text/context distinction, the act of reading – the 
performance of the text – becomes the context in which it is 
understood. The importance of the text, and its ultimate “meaning”, 
no longer rests within the text itself, but in the contexts that stick to 
it.  
In musical terms that would result in the abolition of any direct link 
between the composer’s prior life, the social circumstances that 
engendered the production of the musical work and the musical 
work itself. In fact, music ceases to be “a work” at all. “Work” in an 
aesthetic sense can in Martin’s words (2002), only refer to “people 
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acting together to produce ‘works’” or to “meanings as created in 
and through the interpretative ‘work’ of individuals in interaction with 
each other”. Therefore, with the poietic out of the equation, the 
ontology of the musical work necessarily alters as well. An aesthetic 
inquiry into the social production of meanings deals inescapably with 
an “unstable work, one that recedes or ‘vanishes’ before our eyes as 
it encounters the different preconceptions of particular cultural com-
munities”, as Samson (2001) puts it. As Barthes conceives it, music 
is always in the present, always performative. The only context that 
matters is the present. 
Falling silent, the second implication of the performative turn accord-
ing to Abbate (2004), is more problematic. Nicholas Cook’s (2006) 
attempts to analyse performance illustrates musicology falling silent. 
His use of graphs, dots, lines and waves to compare performances, 
the particular “cultural significance” of which is relegated to future 
inquiry, is mute when it comes to meaning in music (Cook, 2006). 
Abbate’s version (2004) is equally silent, in content and metaphor: 
she reconfigures the ineffability of music as its indeterminacy and 
the inability of the body to speak of its experience of music as 
“material reality”.5 If musicology is falling silent, is it because it 
conceives of music as personal, meditative and non-interactionist, or 
because its traditional methods of inquiry cannot capture perfor-
mance, because it does not know how to deal with the presence of 
music?  
Both Cook (2006) and Abbate (2004) fail to connect to the reality of 
performance. Cook hides away in the throngs of historical re-
cordings, constructing a glass box around the performer to super-
ficially separate him from others. Abbate zooms in on the personal 
experience of the listener. Both ignore the fact that performance 
involves more than one party – it revolves around sound, not si-
lence, talking, not ineffability. As ethnomusicologists have long since 
recognised, performance space lends itself to the re-enactment of 
social patterns that have a life beyond the four walls of the concert 
hall; that when negotiating musical performances people do not 
leave their political allegiances behind, but act them out through 
music. This is why musical performances not only mirror society, but 
play an active role in creating patterns of interaction.6  
                                      
5 Cf. Berger (2005) on the aestheticism of Abbate’s approach.  
6 Cf. Attali (1985), Stokes (1994) especially the chapter by Bailey on Afghan 
national identity, as well as Kaemmer (1993). 
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There is no easy way out of the double play of ineffability and im-
manent meaning. Metamorphosis is required: the shedding of an old 
skin of fundamental beliefs in favour of a new one. A genuine con-
cern with context and the social dimension of music cannot sit 
together comfortably with romantic notions of the ineffability of mu-
sic. In order to detranscendentalise musical meaning, performance 
needs to stand at the centre of musicological inquiry.  
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